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Optimal Employee Ownership Contracts Under Ambiguity Aversion

Guillaume Garnotel, Hachmi Ben Ameur, Jean-Luc Prigent, Nicolas Aubert | January, 2018

The aim of this paper is to compute and describe the conditions of an optimal employee ownership contract between an employer and an ambiguity‐averse employee. We then introduce ambiguity aversion in the baseline model of Aubert et al. (2014) using the multiple prior preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and its extension proposed by Maccheroni … Read More

Employee Ownership: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Management Entrenchment vs. Reward Management

Andre Lapied, Guillaume Garnotel, Nicolas Aubert, Patrick Rousseau | June, 2014

Employee ownership is often used not only as a reward management tool but also as an entrenchment mechanism. The literature suggests that good managers use employee ownership as a reward management tool, whereas bad managers implement it for entrenchment, thus suggesting the existence of an equilibrium level of employee ownership. The contributions of this paper … Read More