It has been observed that corporate law and labour (or employment) law are in essence separate fields of legal scholarship and regulatory policy. This separation does not mean that there has been no interest by company lawyers in labour law or vice versa; nor does it mean that the two fields do not have relevance to one another. Clearly both corporate law and labour law have provided certain fundamental starting points for analysis which have helped shape the regulatory scope of each other.
The Rollins family assembly was meeting to choose between several business strategies, including an employee stock ownership plan.
By law, shareholders have an exclusive right to make certain corporate decisions, and this arrangement is generally justified by the shareholder’s role as the owner of the firm. However, many thoughtful observers hold that such a privileged position for shareholders is morally objectionable, in part because it neglects the important role played by employees.
In the wake of the spectacular bankruptcies of Enron, United Airlines, and Polaroid, employee stock ownership plans have come under intense media scrutiny during the past year. The staggering losses of employees’ retirement savings have prompted pundits to predict the demise of ESOPs, and politicians to call for regulatory overhaul.
This article describes several forms of stock purchase plans in Canada and examines participation using the Workplace and Employee Survey. Some U.S. statistics are presented as well.
In light of varying outlooks on the process of individualisation in the hitherto collectively regulated industries, it was thought worthwhile revisiting the three disputes (those involving CRA Weipa, BHP, and the Commonwealth Bank) and thoroughly documenting them with a view to discovering what light they shed on the objectives of the individualisation process.
There are at least six reasons why we should be concerned with encouraging employee ownership at thesubnational level: at the level of the state, the province, the region, the municipality, or other subnationalgovernmental units or at the level of the industrial branch, cutting across governmental geographic units.
This paper reviews the conflicts of interests introduced by employee participation in the governance of a firm and how these can be constructively resolved by introducing a division of power between investors and employees and/or between management and workers.
This analysis examines recent trends in stock ownership and explains the reasons for the dramatic increase in stock ownership among a broader and increasingly diverse number of Americans.
St. Lukes, a rebellious young agency spun out of the once-revolutionary Chiat/Day, practices what it preaches — the gospel of total ethics and common ownership.
Based on a sample of three employee-owned and seven conventional companies, this study empirically tests the theoretical claim that employee ownership and management reduces inequality at the firm level. Inequality is broadly defined as the unequal distribution of income, wealth, power, prestige, and privileges, as well as the existence of social boundaries between classes.